

## Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00

PRS-01 /032 R

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P 282123Z FEB 76 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DR. IKLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE 2/27/76

1. FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF A PRESS BRIEFING GIVEN  
BY ACDA DIRECTOR FRED C. IKLE FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1976:

DR. IKLE: THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE DEBATE ABOUT THE  
QUESTION OF VIOLATIONS IN OUR FIRST SALT AGREEMENTS. THIS  
IS NOT WHAT I WANT TO TALK ABOUT TODAY. I WANT TO TALK  
ABOUT THE FUTURE OF VERIFICATION -- THE FUTURE IN MONITOR-  
ING OUR AGREEMENTS SO THAT WE CAN BE SURE THAT THEY ARE  
BEING COMPLIED WITH. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF PUBLIC  
CONCERN ABOUT THIS QUESTION -- OF HOW WE CAN MONITOR --  
WHETHER THE OTHER SIDE IS ABIDING BY THE AGREEMENTS. THIS  
IS ALSO A QUESTION OF GREAT CONCERN TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.  
WE HAVE THEREFORE PREPARED A PUBLICATION WHICH CARE-  
FULLY TRIES TO EXPLAIN THE COMPLEXITIES OF VERIFICATION,  
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT AND HOW WE MUST APPROACH IT,  
WITHOUT COVERING UP AND WITHOUT PRETENSE. THERE ARE A  
GREAT MANY PITFALLS IN THIS AREA. IT IS EASY TO GET  
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TRAPPED. FOR EXAMPLE, ONLY TWO DAYS AGO, SENATORS KENNEDY,

HUMPHREY AND JAVITS INTRODUCED A SENATE DRAFT RESOLUTION

WHICH WOULD DO THE VERY OPPOSITE FROM WHAT IT PROPOSES TO DO. BY ACCEPTING THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE LIMITATION OF CRUISE MISSILES, IT WOULD LEAD US INTO PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION THAT COULD BE INSOLVABLE. BY PROPOSING TO LIMIT MOST CRUISE MISSILES TO 600 KILOMETERS IN RANGE IT WOULD NOT ONLY FAIL TO DRAW THE PROPER DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRUISE MISSILES THAT CAN BE USED FOR STRATEGIC PURPOSES THAT BELONG INTO SALT FROM THOSE THAT MIGHT BE USED IN A CONVENTIONAL ROLE AND A NAVAL ROLE FOR REGIONAL PURPOSES, BUT IT WOULD ALSO CREATE FOR THE FUTURE OF SALT POTENTIALS FOR AMBIGUITIES, UNCERTAINTIES, DISPUTES, PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION. BY COMPARISON WITH THESE PROBLEMS, THE DISPUTE WE NOW HAVE ON OCCASION ABOUT THE QUESTIONS OF VIOLATIONS OR COMPLIANCE OF SALT I AGREEMENTS WOULD BE A SUNDAY SCHOOL PICNIC. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO HAVE YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q: I WONDER IF YOU COULD EXPAND ON THAT STATEMENT THAT YOU MADE THAT THE SENATORIAL PROPOSAL WOULD INDEED BE TO THESE VERY COMPLICATED VERIFICATION PROBLEMS. CAN YOU BE MUCH MORE SPECIFIC IN WHAT AREAS?

A: IT PROPOSES FOR MOST CRUISE MISSILES, A LIMIT OF 600 KILOMETERS IN RANGE BUT THAT KIND OF A RANGE IS VERY

DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE TO MONITOR. THE IDEA SUGGESTED IN THE RESOLUTION OF AN INSTANT TEST MORATORIUM, TESTING OF CRUISE MISSILES ABOVE THE RANGE, DOES NOT GIVE US A SOLUTION, FOR CRUISE MISSILES DO NOT HAVE TO BE TESTED TO THE FULL RANGE, MUCH AS A BOEING 747 CAN BE TESTED BY FLYING IT FROM NEW YORK TO CHICAGO, AND YOU KNOW IT CAN FLY TO LOS ANGELES -- SO CRUISE MISSILES CAN BE TESTED AT SHORTER RANGES. IN ADDITION, IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONCEAL THE TESTS.

Q: ALL RIGHT, LET ME STOP YOU THERE FOR A MOMENT. I THINK PART OF THAT RESOLUTION ALSO SPOKE ABOUT AIR-LAUNCH CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE ABOVE THE 2000 KILOMETERS AS BEING PERMISSIBLE OR ACCEPTABLE. COULD YOU ADDRESS YOURSELF TO THAT?

A: WELL, INDEED THAT FURTHER COMPOUNDS THE DIFFICULTY.  
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IF YOU HAVE AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES UP TO 2500

KMS (ABOUT 1200 MILES) AND THOSE ARE BEING TESTED, THEN YOU CAN TEST THE CRUISE MISSILES WHICH YOU MIGHT USE ON SUBMARINES OFF OUR COAST ON SOVIET SHIPS, OFF AN AIRCRAFT AT A LARGER RANGE; AND WITH YOUR SHIPS AND SUBMARINES YOU WOULD MERELY HAVE TO TEST WHETHER THEY COULD PROPERLY BE LAUNCHED FROM A SHIP WITH A MUCH

SHORTER RANGE. THIS IS WHY IT IS SO DIFFICULT TO USE THE TEST LIMITATION AS A HANDLE ON THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM.

Q: I WANT TO GO BACK TO THE SEA-GOING CRUISE MISSILES -- 600 KILOMETERS. I'D LIKE YOU TO EXPLAIN WHY IT IS SO DIFFICULT TO VERIFY. I THINK YOU SUGGESTED IT BUT I WONDER IF YOU WOULD GO OVER IT AGAIN AND BE SPECIFIC.

A: FOR ONE, THE RUSSIANS HAVE HUNDREDS OF OLDER CRUISE MISSILES WHICH ARE VERY LARGE. THEY'RE ABOUT FOUR TIMES THE SIZE OF THE CRUISE MISSILES THAT WE ARE WORKING ON.

Q: THIS IS THE STYX, I SUPPOSE?

A: THERE ARE A NUMBER OF THEM -- SUBMARINE BASED, SHIP BASED, AIR BASED. WE ASSUME THEY'RE MEANT FOR RANGES OF 300 TO 400 MILES, BUT WITHIN THEM THEY WOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY, THE PROPULSION TO GO MUCH FURTHER, MAYBE UP TO 2000 MILES. THE DIFFERENCE TO A LARGE EXTENT DEPENDS ON GUIDANCE. BUT GUIDANCE CAN BE IMPROVED BY TESTING IT ON AIRCRAFT INSTEAD OF CRUISE MISSILES, BY TESTING IT TO SHORTER RANGES, OR BY TESTING IT IN A CONCEALED FASHION.

Q: DO I UNDERSTAND YOU TO SAY THAT A LIMITATION ON SUBMARINE LAUNCHED MISSILES COULD BE ACTUALLY TESTED UNDER THE AIR LAUNCH RANGE?

A: YOU HAVE

A: YOU CAN HAVE INTERCHANGEABLE CRUISE MISSILES, INDEED OURS ARE LARGELY INTERCHANGEABLE.

Q: THEREFORE THE LIMIT OF 2500 KILOMETERS AS SUGGESTED IN THAT RESOLUTION REALLY WOULDN'T BE A LIMIT, IT WOULDN'T BE A CONSTRAINT, WOULD IT?

A: THAT IS RIGHT. THAT IS ONE OF THE PROBLEMS.

Q: THEN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE RESOLUTION?

A: THAT WE, IN OUR IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE LIMITED AND WE WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSTRAINED -- WITH OUR OPEN SYSTEM, WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL AND PRESS UNCLASSIFIED

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MONITORING OF WHAT WE ARE DOING -- TO BUILD OUR SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES SO THEY CANNOT EXCEED THAT LIMIT. YET, THE OTHER SIDE COULD TEST ITS CRUISE MISSILES FROM THE AIR AT A LONG RANGE. THEY CAN BUILD THEIR CRUISE MISSILES AND WE WOULDN'T HAVE A HANDLE ON VERIFICATION.

Q: WHAT YOU SAID JUST NOW TO ME SOUNDS AS THOUGH IT COULD EASILY BE APPLIED TO ALMOST ANY AGREEMENT NOW IN DISCUSSION?

A: THE VERIFICATION OF ANY CRUISE MISSILE PRESENTS A MAJOR PROBLEM. BUT I THINK THROUGH CAREFUL NEGOTIATION, CAREFUL DESIGNING OF AN AGREEMENT, IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THE VIABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC LIMITATIONS OF SALT. THIS IS WHAT WE WANT TO DO. WE DO NOT WANT TO ADD 10,000 CRUISE MISSILES TO OUR STRATEGIC FORCES. THAT'S

NONSENSE. WE WANT TO REDUCE STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES. WE THEREFORE HAVE TO FIND A WAY OF SEPARATING THESE LOWER-RANGE TACTICAL USES OF CRUISE MISSILES FROM APPLICATIONS OF CRUISE MISSILES THAT WOULD UPSET THE STRATEGIC BALANCE.

Q: A SOMEWHAT MORE POLITICAL QUESTION. YOU DO NOT VERY OFTEN HOLD THESE CONFERENCES. WHY THIS PARTICULAR TIME, AND WHY YOU RATHER THAN SOMEONE ELSE IN THE BUILDING?

A: USUALLY WE DO HOLD PRESS BRIEFINGS WHEN WE HAVE SOMETHING TO REPORT THAT COMES OUT OF THIS AGENCY. WE HAD ONE A FEW MONTHS AGO AT THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE ON A VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION, BASED ON A STUDY WHICH WE HAD SPONSORED AND RELEASED AT THAT TIME. NOW WE HAVE THIS STUDY ON VERIFICATION PROBLEMS WHICH IS GERMANE TO THE PROBLEM RAISED BY THE SENATORS' RESOLUTION -- INCIDENTALLY, THE INTENTION OF WHICH WE VERY MUCH SUPPORT; THEY WANTED TO SUPPORT THE SALT AGREEMENT, AND THAT IS WHAT WE OBVIOUSLY APPRECIATE, AND LIKE. THE COINCIDENCE OF OUR PUBLICATION, OF THE VERIFICATION PUBLICATION, THAT'S WHAT I WANTED TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT.

Q: HOW LONG HAS THIS PUBLICATION BEEN IN THE WORKS?

A: WE HAVE WORKED ON IT -- WE HAVE GONE THROUGH MANY DIFFERENT DRAFTS, FOR AT LEAST A YEAR. WE HAVE RE-WRITTEN AND RE-WRITTEN IT, AND THEN WE HAD TO CHECK IT OUT WITH OUR COLLEAGUES THROUGH THE ADMINISTRATION -- GET THEIR MANY HELPFUL COMMENTS. WE HAVE NOW REACHED THE FINAL UNCLASSIFIED

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VERSION WHICH CAN GO TO THE PRINTER. YOU ARE GETTING IT A FEW DAYS IN ADVANCE.

Q" DR. IKLE, IMPLICIT IN YOUR STATEMENT IS THAT THE SENATE RESOLUTION COULD BE DAMAGING IN TERMS OF OUR OWN NEGOTIATING POSITION IN SALT -- THAT A MORATORIUM COULD HURT OUR LEVERAGE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT. DO YOU WANT TO MAKE THAT IMPLICIT? IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE SUGGESTING?

A: YES. CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION COULD BE DAMAGING, IF THEY BECAME THE SENSE OF CONGRESS. NOW LET ME REPEAT AGAIN, WE APPRECIATE THE GENERAL THRUST OF THE RESOLUTION, AND THAT THEY SUPPORT THE RAPID CONCLUSION OF A SALT AGREEMENT. BUT UNFORTUNATELY CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION DO THE VERY OPPOSITE. THEY COULD COMPLICATE A SALT AGREEMENT -- NOT ONLY ITS CONCLUSION, BUT ITS VIABILITY OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS.

Q. WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE IN OUR CAPABILITIES, TO USE NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, OVER WHAT IT WAS, SAY, 20 YEARS AGO? WHAT'S THE STATE OF THE ART? WHAT CONFIDENCE DO WE HAVE NOW?

A. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS COMPARED WITH 20 YEARS AGO. I CANNOT ELABORATE ON THOSE BECAUSE WE DO NOT LIKE TO DISCUSS METHODS AND SOURCES IN PUBLIC, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. BUT THESE IMPROVEMENTS HAVE MADE POSSIBLE THE IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS IN SALT 1 TO RELY ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. HOWEVER, NOW OUR AMBITIONS IN ARMS CONTROL HAVE INCREASED. WE WANT TO COVER MORE THINGS. WE WOULD LIKE TO GET A GOOD HANDLE ON CRUISE MISSILES THAT PLAY A ROLE IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. YET FURTHER PROGRESS IN VERIFICATION HAS BEEN SLOW; INDEED, WE HAVE RETROGRESSED BECAUSE OF THE TURBULANCE WE HAVE BEEN GOING THROUGH REGARDING OUR INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. AS THIS PUBLICATION WILL SHOW, SOME OF OUR MONITORING SYSTEMS ARE LOCATED IN OTHER COUNTRIES, AND IN MANY INSTANCES THESE HAVE COME UNDER JEOPARDY.

Q. DR. IKLE, ON THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS, ARE YOU SUGGESTING THAT THE PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION ARE STILL SO FAR FROM BEING RESOLVED THAT WE ARE A LONG, LONG WAY FROM BEING ABLE TO INCLUDE CRUISE MISSILES IN A SALT 11 AGREE-  
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MENT -- UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IN VERIFICATION?

A. NO. WE HOPE TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS - BUT CAREFUL PROGRESS - IN COMPLETING A SALT 11 AGREEMENT. AND WE HOPE TO NEGOTIATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE CRUISE MISSILE, BACKFIRE, AND ALL THE OTHER PROBLEMS. ALL I'M SAYING IS THAT THIS PARTICULAR APPROACH, SUGGESTED IN THIS RESOLUTION, WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH THE PURPOSE, THE GOOD PURPOSE, THAT THE RESOLUTION TRIES TO ACCOMPLISH.

Q. IS THERE ANY COMMON GROUND BETWEEN YOU AND THE SENATORS ON THE RESOLUTION?

A. THE GENERAL SPIRIT OF SUPPORT OF SALT, OF MOVING AHEAD RAPIDLY, THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING FUTURE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS -- DEFINITELY.

Q. CAN YOU SEE ANY KIND OF MORATORIUM, MAYBE R & D, WHICH COULD SLOW DOWN DEVELOPMENT, OR IS IT FULL SPEED AHEAD?

A. LIMITATIONS ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WE HAVE GENERALLY SHIED AWAY FROM BECAUSE THESE ARE THE HARDEST TO VERIFY.

IN CERTAIN INSTANCES, BY A LIMITATION ON TESTING YOU CAN ACCOMPLISH A VERY VIABLE BAN ON DEPLOYMENT. AN ILLUSTRATION WE NOW CONSIDER IN THAT LIGHT, FROM HINDSIGHT, A POSSIBILITY NOW BEHIND US, IS A BAN ON MIRV TESTING FOR A VERIFIABLE BAN ON MIRV DEPLOYMENT. BUT THAT ANALOGY IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR THE CRUISE MISSILE.

Q: BUT A BAN ON MIRV TESTING WAS OBJECTED TO MUCH AS YOU ARE OBJECTING NOW. WHAT I'M TRYING TO GET AT IS THERE ANYTHING THAT YOU CAN SEE THAT COULD SLOW DOWN DEPLOYMENT

OF THE CRUISE MISSILES, IN A TECHNOLOGICAL SENSE.

A: IT IS FAR MORE DIFFICULT, BECAUSE LIKE AIRCRAFT THEY CAN BE USED AT DIFFERENT RANGES AND HAVE DIFFERENT CAPABILITIES. SOME OF THE UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE RANGE OF CRUISE MISSILES IS ANALOGOUS TO THE ISSUES THAT ARE DEBATED ABOUT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER, WHICH HAS A RANGE MUCH LONGER THAN THE PROPOSED LIMITS ON CRUISE MISSILES AND, OF COURSE, A PAYLOAD 50 TO 100 TIMES LARGER THAN THAT OF A CRUISE MISSILE. IT HAS BEEN STATED BY THE OTHER SIDE THAT THE INTENTION IS TO USE THAT BOMBER FOR THEATER OR TACTICAL OR REGIONAL PURPOSES. BUT BY THE SAME TOKEN, UNCLASSIFIED

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CRUISE MISSILES CAN SERVE THEATER OR TACTICAL PURPOSES AND THIS DISTINCTION IS INDEED VERY DIFFICULT TO DRAW. NONETHELESS, WE DO WANT TO PREVENT A DEVELOPMENT IN INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITY FOR CRUISE MISSILES THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENTS. WE WANT TO MAINTAIN THESE LIMITS; WE WANT TO LOWER THEM.

Q: DR. IKLE, IS WHAT YOU'RE OBJECTING TO THAT THE RESOLUTION CALLS FOR EITHER A MUTUAL MORATORIUM WITH THE SOVIET UNION OR A LIMITATION ABOVE 2500 KMS. YESTERDAY AT THE PENTAGON, DR. CURRIE SAID THE CRUISE MISSILES THAT ARE ON THE DRAWING BOARDS NOW, THE AIR-LAUNCHED ONES, ARE FOR 1500 MILES NOT MORE. THERE IS NO CONSTRAINT THEN ON THE AIR-LAUNCHED. ON THE SEA-LAUNCHED YOU SAY THAT YOU CAN TEST THEM ANYWAY. THERE WOULD BE CONSTRAINT ON DEPLOYING THEM, WHICH WE'RE NOT READY TO DO ANYWAY, AND YOU MIGHT HAVE A SALT AGREEMENT BY THAT TIME.

A: WELL, IT WAS THE ERROR OF ASSUMING THAT THE MORATORIUM ON THE TESTING OF SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WOULD PROVIDE A SOLUTION FOR VERIFYING A SUBSEQUENT BAN ON DEPLOYMENT OF THESE CRUISE MISSILES ABOVE 600 KMS. THAT'S A TRAP. THAT BY PROPOSING THIS INSTANT MORATORIUM ON THE TESTING ON ALL BUT THE AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, YOU GET A HANDLE ON THE VERIFICATION OF SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES ABOVE THAT LIMIT.

YOU DON'T BECAUSE YOU COULD TEST THEM IN THE AIR-LAUNCH MODE. YOU WOULD THUS MISLEAD THE AMERICAN PUBLIC OR MISLEAD OTHER PEOPLE, THAT YOU HAVE A SOLUTION HERE FOR THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM FOR CRUISE MISSILES. THEN THERE IS A SECOND ERROR HERE, THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSED 600 KM DIVIDING LINE REALLY SEPARATES STRATEGIC APPLICATIONS OF CRUISE MISSILES THAT BELONG IN SALT FROM OTHER APPLICATIONS OF CRUISE MISSILES THAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. IT HAS OFTEN BEEN MENTIONED THAT AT 600 KMS OFF OUR COAST OUR CITIES COULD BE REACHED. ON THE OTHER HAND, 1200 KMS OFF OUR SHIPS,

CRUISE MISSILES MAY HAVE A CAPABILITY IN A NATO CONTEXT OR A MIDEASTERN CONTEXT WHICH HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH SALT, AND WHICH WE HAVE TO CONTROL AND LIMIT IN SEPARATE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

A. ARE YOU SAYING THAT THE CORRECT APPROACH TO CRUISE  
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MISSILES IS TO VERIFY THEIR DEPLOYMENT AS DISTINCT FROM THEIR RANGE?

A. VERIFICATION OF DEPLOYMENT MIGHT BE IMPORTANT - MIGHT BE HELPFUL, BUT I AM NOT SAYING THIS PROVIDES THE ENTIRE SOLUTION. THERE MAY SIMPLY BE PROBLEMS WHICH CANNOT BE SOLVED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF VERIFICATION. THEREFORE WE HAVE TO BUILD OUR APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL AROUND THESE PROBLEMS. THERE ARE MANY OTHER AREAS - TAKE THE PROBLEM OF ACCURACY IMPROVEMENTS. IT HAS OFTEN BEEN SUGGESTED THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF STABILITY YOU MIGHT WANT TO CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS IN ACCURACY. THIS IS NOT PART OF OUR APPROACH TO SALT BECAUSE WE HAVE LONG DETERMINED THAT THIS CANNOT BE VERIFIED. AS LONG AS WE CANNOT OPEN UP MORE THE SOVIET SOCIETY, AND REDUCE THE SECRECY IN GENERAL WAYS, AND IMPROVE OUR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS DRAMATICALLY, SOME DESIRABLE APPROACHES IN ARMS CONTROL MAY BE FORECLOSED.

Q. YOU SUGGESTED EARLIER THAT YOU DID HAVE HOPES OF A SALT II AGREEMENT BEING ACHIEVED TO INCLUDE BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILES. NOW IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE, OR MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO VERIFY ASPECTS OF CRUISE MISSILES, HOW CAN WE HAVE A SALT AGREEMENT?

A. CERTAINLY I DID NOT INTEND TO PUT IT PRECISELY THAT WAY I SAID WE HAVE HOPES THAT WE CAN DEVELOP A VIABLE SALT AGREEMENT AND SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDE A SALT AGREEMENT BASED ON THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD. THERE IS A QUESTION ABOUT HANDLING CRUISE MISSILES AND BACKFIRE AND OTHER ISSUES. THESE QUESTIONS WE ARE NOW TRYING TO RESOLVE.

Q: BUT IS IT A VALUABLE AGREEMENT IF IT LEAVES OUR CRUISE MISSILES WHICH MIGHT HAVE A STRATEGIC RANGE?

A: WE HAVE TO COPE SOMEHOW WITH THE PROBLEM THAT THERE ARE SYSTEMS WHICH COULD HAVE A STRATEGIC RANGE, SUCH AS BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILES, AND WE HAVE TO SEE HOW WE CAN SOLVE THAT. THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT WE DO NOT GET DRIVEN INTO OSTENSIBLE SOLUTIONS WHICH WILL CREATE NEW PROBLEMS FOR US.

Q: AS OF NOW YOU SEE NO WAY FOR A SALT II AGREEMENT THAT CAN ADEQUATELY COPE WITH CRUISE MISSILES IS WHAT YOU SEEM TO BE SUGGESTING.

A: I THINK A WAY CAN BE FOUND TO ADEQUATELY SOLVE THE  
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CRUISE MISSILE PROBLEM FOR SALT, AND THE BACKFIRE PROBLEM.

Q: INSIDE OF SALT OR OUTSIDE OF SALT?

A: WELL, THE SALT AGREEMENT THAT WE ARE WORKING ON HAS TO SOLVE A GREAT MANY PROBLEMS, REGARDING BACKFIRE, REGARDING CRUISE MISSILES. SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS MAY NOT BE SOLVED IN A DEFINITIVE WAY. THE SALT I AGREEMENT DIDN'T SOLVE THE QUESTION OF AIRCRAFT. THE SALT II AGREEMENT WILL NOT SOLVE ALL THE QUESTIONS AND WE SEE SALT AS A CONTINUING PROCESS. SALT III AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, MBFR AND CONTINUING ...

Q: DR. IKLE, IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU ARE ANTICIPATING

A SALT II AGREEMENT THIS YEAR THAT WILL REFER TO THESE TWO PROBLEMS -- CRUISE MISSILES AND BACKFIRE BUT NOT DEAL WITH THEM IN NUMBERS OR IN ANY OTHER WAY AND ACCEPT THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD AS THE AMERICAN INTERPRETATION.

A: WELL, YOU'RE NOW GETTING INTO THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS AND I DON'T LIKE TO DISCUSS THAT IN PUBLIC.

Q: FORGIVE ME, BUT YOU'RE NIBBLING AROUND THE EDGES ON THIS. ON THE ONE HAND YOU SEEM TO BE SAYING IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE THE KIND OF AGREEMENT THAT THE SENATORS ARE PROPOSING AND YOU MADE A VERY COMPELLING CASE FOR THAT. BUT YOU'RE NOT WILLING TO GO THE NEXT STEP AND SAY THEREFORE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE SALT II AGREEMENT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH THAT LEVEL OF VERIFICATION THIS YEAR. AND YET YOU SEEM TO BE IMPLYING IT.

A: YOU'RE RIGHT -- I AM NOT HERE DISCUSSING THE STRUCTURE OF THE SALT AGREEMENT THAT WE ARE STRIVING FOR -- OUR APPROACH. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS WE DO NOT WANT TO GO PUBLIC ON THESE MATTERS BEFORE THE AGREEMENT CAN BE PRESENTED IN A FINAL FORM. WHAT I AM DISCUSSING HERE ARE CERTAIN ERRORS ABOUT PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION, WHICH CAN AFFECT SALT RIGHT NOW -- AND THEY DO IN THIS RESOLUTION -- WHICH COULD AFFECT OTHER ARMS CONTROL

NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS PUBLICATION, TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE SO THAT WE CAN TALK ABOUT THESE VERY DIFFICULT AND VERY FRUSTRATING PROBLEMS ON THE BASIS OF SOLID FACTS.

Q: YOU HAVE IMPLIED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE CRUISE MISSILES INCLUDED IN THIS YEAR'S SALT AGREEMENT. HAVE I TOTALLY MISUNDERSTOOD?

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A: YOU HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD ME THERE. I SAID EXPLICITLY, NOT IMPLIED, THAT THIS PARTICULAR APPROACH FOR CRUISE MISSILE LIMITATIONS AND CRUISE MISSILE VERIFICATION



SUGGESTED IN THIS RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON A FALLACIOUS ASSUMPTION ABOUT VERIFICATION. I HAVE NOT GONE BEYOND THAT. I HAVE NOT SAID THAT THE PROBLEM OF CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER PROBLEMS CANNOT BE SOLVED TO GET A SATISFACTORY SALT AGREEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

Q: CAN THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION BE RESOLVED THIS YEAR? IS IT POSSIBLE THAT IT CAN BE RESOLVED THIS YEAR?

A: I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN DEVELOP IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS A SALT AGREEMENT THAT PROPERLY HANDLES THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM.

Q: OF CRUISE MISSILES?

A: OF CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER ISSUES.

Q: DR. IKLE, CAN I FOLLOW UP ON THAT? I WANT TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU ARE SAYING. ARE YOU SAYING THAT IN ANY EVENT VERIFICATION OF CRUISE MISSILES IS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE WHETHER THE RANGE CUTOFF IS 600 KMS OR 2500 KMS? BUT THE RANGE CUTOFF AT 600 KMS, IF THERE IS CHEATING, COULD HAVE SIGNIFICANCE THAT CHEATING AT 2500 KMS WOULD NOT HAVE. IF THE RANGE LIMIT IS SET UP THAT HIGH EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS DO CHEAT, IT WOULDN'T MAKE THAT MUCH DIFFERENCE ANYWAY; IF SET LOWER AND THEY CHEATED IT WOULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE. IS THAT WHAT YOU MEAN?

A: THAT'S PART OF THE PROBLEM, THAT CERTAIN LIMITATIONS MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT TO VERIFY THAN OTHERS AND CERTAIN LIMITATIONS MAY HAVE GREATER MILITARY IMPORTANCE OR LEAD TO GREATER ASYMMETRIES THAN OTHERS. NOW AGAIN I DO NOT WANT TO BE PINNED DOWN TO PARTICULAR FIGURES.

Q: WE CAN CHANGE THOSE FIGURES. I AM JUST TRYING TO SEE -- TO MAKE CLEAR THIS POINT -- THAT THE CONSEQUENCE OF CHEATING AT A LOW RANGE CUTOFF, SAY 600 KMS, ARE VASTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHEATING FROM A HIGHER RANGE, SAY 2500 KMS. WE COULD STNAD CHEATING AT A 2500 LEVEL; EVEN IF THEY DEVELOPED ONE WITH A RANGE OF 4000 KMS IT WOULDN'T MAKE AS MUCH DIFFERENCE AS IF WE HAD A

CUTOFF AT 600 KMS AND THAT MISSILE IN FACT FLEW 2500 KMS.  
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A: I THINK THEORETICALLY YOUR QUESTION HAS A VALID APPROACH HERE. YOU HAVE TO COMBINE ANALYSIS OF WHAT THE IMPLICATIONS ARE OF CHEATING OF VARIOUS RANGES, OF VARIOUS LIMITATIONS WITH ITS MILITARY IMPORTANCE. WE HAVE ACCEPTED ARMS LIMITATIONS THAT ARE ESSENTIALLY UNVERIFIABLE BECAUSE THEY ARE ON MARGINAL ISSUES. THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IS AN EXAMPLE.

Q: LET ME JUST FOLLOW UP AGAIN. ARE YOU SAYING THAT THE KIND OF AGREEMENT YOU CAN SEE OUR REACHING ON CRUISE

MISSILES WOULDN'T REALLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION BUT WOULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF CONSEQUENCES ACHIEVED?

A: PART OF THE APPROACH TO VERIFICATION PROBLEM IS INDEED -- YOU'RE RIGHT -- TO REDUCE THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHEATING OR VIOLATIONS. PART OF THE APPROACH MIGHT BE NOT TO COVER THINGS SUCH AS ACCURACY LIMITATIONS WHICH WE DON'T TRY TO COVER IN SALT. PART OF THE APPROACH MAY BE TO WORK HARD AND TRY TO IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY FOR VERIFICATION AND TO PROPOSE NEW APPROACHES TO VERIFICATION.

Q: LIKE WHAT? WHAT NEW APPROACHES WOULD THERE BE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION?

A: THIS IS GETTING INTO HIGHLY CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL DETAILS, BUT WE CAN THINK AND WE MUST THINK AND WE MUST WORK OVER THE YEARS ON NEW APPROACHES, ON NEW FORMS OF ACCESS ...

Q: BUT IS THERE ANY SUCH TECHNICAL MEANS AVAILABLE NOW?

A: I CERTAINLY WOULD NOT WANT TO GIVE UP AT THIS TIME. IF WE HAD HAD THIS DISCUSSION, SAY 10-15 YEARS AGO, WE MAY NOT HAVE THOUGHT OF THE CAPABILITIES WE NOW HAVE.

Q: DO WE HAVE THE CAPABILITIES OF VERIFYING A SALT AGREEMENT THIS YEAR?

A: WELL, THE SALT AGREEMENT, FIRST OF ALL, WOULDN'T TAKE EFFECT RIGHT AWAY. WE HAVE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT GOES UNTIL 1977.

Q: DR. IKLE, WHAT DID THE MIRV BUY THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS OF SECURITY? AND WHAT IS THE CRUISE MISSILE LIKELY UNCLASSIFIED

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TO BUY?

A: FROM HINDSIGHT, I PERSONALLY FEEL WE MADE A MISTAKE SEVERAL YEARS AGO, '68, '69, NOT TO TRY TO GO FOR A BAN IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVS, BECAUSE FROM HINDSIGHT -- AND IT IS EASY TO SAY FROM

HINDSIGHT - WE CAN NOW SAY THAT SUCH A BAN WOULD HAVE BEEN REASONABLY VERIFIABLE BY PROHIBITING THE TESTING OF MIRVED BALLISTIC SYSTEMS. NOW MANY PEOPLE MAKE THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THAT EXPERIENCE AND THE PROBLEMS REGARDING CRUISE MISSILES. BUT THIS ANALOGY IS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE WE DO NOT HAVE THE HANDLE WE WOULD HAVE HAD FOR A DEPLOYMENT BAN ON MIRVS BY BANNING THE TESTING FOR THE REASONS I EXPLAINED EARLIER. PRECISELY, THE SECOND PART OF YOUR QUESTION, THE FUTURE IMPORTANCE OF CRUISE MISSILES IS SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT TO TELL. IT DEPENDS ON THE COST, THE ACCURACY, THE VIGOR WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS WANT TO

PURSUE TACTICAL CRUISE MISSILES EITHER UNDER THESE LIMITS OR BY CAPABILITIES WHICH EXCEED THESE LIMITS, THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY MAY PLAY A ROLE IN CONVENTIONAL OR NAVAL WARFARE, AND PERHAPS IN STRATEGIC EQUATIONS.

Q. IS THERE ANY WAY THAT YOU SEE BOTH SIDES GO UP ONE MORE SPIRAL THAT BOTH SIDES OR EITHER SIDE IS MORE SECURE? IN OTHER WORDS, WHERE IS THE PAYOFF IN MAKING THE WORLD SAFER?

A. THE PROBLEM THAT WE HAVE HERE IS ARMS BEING DEVELOPED, CONVENTIONAL ARMS, NEW SOVIET INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES-- THERE IS THE PROBLEM OF THE BACKFIRE, WHICH HAS A SUBSTANTIAL CAPABILITY IN THEATER OR REGIONAL ROLE, WHATEVER YOU THINK ABOUT IT IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT; AND IT IS VERY DESIRABLE -- YOU'RE RIGHT -- TO HAVE SUBSEQUENT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, TO PRESS AHEAD WITH SALT 111 AND OTHER FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, TO TRY TO LIMIT THE COMPETITION IN THESE SYSTEMS. BUT YOU DON'T ACCOMPLISH THOSE OBJECTIVES BY IMPOSING UNVERIFIABLE LIMITS ON SYSTEMS THAT WE'RE DEVELOPING.

Q. DR. IKLE, DO YOU THINK IT'S POSSIBLE IN THIS ELECTION YEAR TO GET HARD, SIMPLE NUMERICAL LIMITS ...

A. THE PROBLEM WITH HAVING HARD, SIMPLE NUMERICAL LIMITS IS LARGELY A PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION, AND THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND THEATER UNCLASSIFIED

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APPLICATIONS, NOT THE PROBLEM OF AN ELECTION YEAR. WE WANT TO PRESS AHEAD HERE AND SEE WHAT WE CAN DO IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO GET A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

Q. TO PURSUE THAT, YOU ARE A POLITICALLY SOPHISTICATED MAN, DOES IT SEEM REASONABLE TO YOU, GIVEN WHAT YOU KNOW OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND THE PROBLEMS OF PUTTING THIS SORT OF PROPOSAL BEFORE THE CONGRESS IN AN ELECTION

YEAR OR THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. WOULD DO IT, THAT YOU COULD REACH SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN AN ELECTION YEAR?

A: I DON'T SEE WHY THE ELECTION YEAR HAS TO PREVENT US FROM NEGOTIATING VIGOROUSLY WITH THE RUSSIANS TOWARD THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT, AND IF IT IS AN AGREEMENT THAT CAN BE SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED, I AM CONFIDENT CONGRESS WILL ACCEPT IT.

Q: DR. IKLE, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN UNDER ATTACK FROM VARIOUS QUARTERS ON THE WAY IT HAS GONE ABOUT IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS. THIS PROPOSAL BY THE THREE SENATORS, DESPITE CONTAINING THIS OBJECTIONABLE PART, WOULD SEEM TO RALLY A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT. IT WAS COINED IN VERY SUPPORTIVE TERMS ON THE WHOLE. WHAT IS THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOING TO TRY TO

STIMULATE SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS FOR ITS APPROACH TO SALT:

A: WE VERY MUCH WELCOME THE SUPPORTIVE PARTS IN THIS RESOLUTION, AND WE TRY TO EXPLAIN TO MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN COMMITTEES, OUR GENERAL APPROACH TO SALT, WE ANSWER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, AND WE WANT TO KEEP CONGRESS FULLY INFORMED OF WHAT WE ARE DOING SO THAT WE CAN GET THEIR VIEWS AND THEIR ADVICE. IT IS MY PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO BRING IN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS NOT ONLY AT THE VERY END WHEN THE AGREEMENT IS FINALIZED, BUT THROUGHOUT THE

ENTIRE PROCESS. AND I HAVE TRIED MYSELF AND MY COLLEAGUES WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE TRIED TO DO THIS.

Q: IS THIS IN LARGE MEASURE WHAT THE SECRETARY HAS BEEN DOING THESE LAST FEW DAYS AND WILL BE DOING NEXT WEEK ON THE HILL?

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A: THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS BEEN DOING THIS ALL ALONG, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND I MYSELF HAVE TRIED TO DO THIS IN PRIVATE AND IN PUBLIC, AND CLASSIFIED HEARINGS WITH CONGRESS.

Q: I AM STILL TROUBLED BECAUSE I DON'T QUITE UNDERSTAND THIS. I WAS GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT ONE OF THE VARIOUS OPTIONS THAT WE HAVE TALKED TO THE RUSSIANS ABOUT INCLUDED OUR AGREEING TO A CUTOFF OF 600 KMS ON SUBMARINE LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. HAVE WE IN FACT PROPOSED THAT TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND IF THAT IS SO, WOULDN'T THE SAME OBJECTIONS APPLY TO YOUR OWN ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS AS YOU'RE MAKING TO THE SENATE RESOLUTION?

A: I MAY BE HANDICAPPED HERE BECAUSE I MAY NOT KNOW ABOUT THE MEETING OR THE HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE THAT YOU ARE REFERRING TO.

Q: IF WE DID PROPOSE THAT, AND YOU MUST HAVE HEARD THE SAME RUMORS THAT I DID ...

A: I READ IT IN YOUR COLUMN ... (LAUGHTER)

Q: IF WE DID PROPOSE THAT 600 KM CUTOFF ON SUB-LAUNCHED MISSILES, WOULDN'T THE SAME PROBLEM APPLY TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL AS YOU'RE SAYING APPLIES TO THE SENATE RESOLUTION PROPOSAL?

A: IF YOU DO EXACTLY THE SAME AS IN THE SENATE RESOLUTION, OBVIOUSLY YOU HAVE THE SAME PROBLEM; THAT FOLLOWS TAUTOLOGICALLY.

Q: DR. IKLE, I WANT TO REPHRASE A QUESTION THAT HAS BEEN ASKED. YOU SAID THAT THERE IS NOTHING ABOUT AN ELECTION YEAR THAT SHOULD PREVENT US FROM NEGOTIATING VIGOROUSLY. THERE ARE VIGOROUS NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE ALL OVER THE PLACE -- ON PANAMA, AND ON OTHER

ISSUES. THERE IS NO EXPECTATION THEY WILL FRUCTIFY

BEFORE NOVEMBER (LAUGHTER) -- I'M ON TELEVISION.

Q: YOU'RE USING DIRTY WORDS (LAUGHTER).

Q: FROM WHAT YOU'RE SAYING, WE ARE GOING TO TAKE A VERY LONG TIME TO WORK OUT THE KIND OF AGREEMENT THAT WILL HAVE THE KIND OF VERIFICATION NECESSARY. IS IT GOING TO TAKE A VERY LONG TIME, FORGETTING THAT IT IS AN ELECTION YEAR?

A: I WOULD NOT HOPE SO, BECAUSE THERE ARE CERTAIN UNCLASSIFIED

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ADVANTAGES TO CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT SOON -- LET'S SAY IN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS RATHER THAN JUST BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN OCTOBER 1977. WE OF COURSE DO HAVE THAT TIME PERIOD. BUT THERE ARE ADVANTAGES IN THAT BOTH SIDES THEN KNOW WHAT THE LIMITATIONS REALLY ARE, THEY AREN'T MAKING COMMITMENTS FOR PRODUCTION AND CAPABILITIES THAT EXCEED THESE LIMITATIONS; THEY CAN ADJUST THEIR PLANNING -- THEY CAN GET READY -- THEY DON'T GET LOCKED INTO COUNTERVAILING PROGRAMS.

Q: DR. IKLE, DO YOU SENSE THAT YOUR POSITION SOMEWHAT OPPOSES THE POSITION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE?

A: NO. WE HAVE A COMMON BASIS HERE AND THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE.

Q: DO YOU THINK THE RUSSIANS BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS INEVITABLE?

A: I HOPE NOT. BECAUSE THE FOUNDATION OF OUR APPROACH IS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR AND I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD GET INTO A FATALISTIC ATTITUDE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE BANKING INEVITABLY ON A NUCLEAR WAR. WE WANT TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE, WE WANT TO STRENGTHEN IT, REDUCE THE LEVELS THROUGH ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY WHICH WORK HAND IN HAND. I THINK IT WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS IF WE GOT INTO THIS FATALISTIC ATTITUDE THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS INEVITABLE.

Q: COULD YOU TELL US A LITTLE BIT MORE ABOUT HOW THIS PRESS CONFERENCE CAME ABOUT? I DON'T WANT TO SOUND PRESUMPTUOUS BUT DID THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUGGEST TO YOU THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING IF YOU CONVENE SUCH A PRESS CONFERENCE TO HAVE A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ABOUT THE SENATORIAL PROPOSAL?

A: THERE WERE TWO EVENTS. FIRST THAT WE HAVE COMPLETED WHAT I THINK IS AN IMPORTANT PUBLICATION AND -- AS IN THE CASE OF A PRIOR PUBLICATION ON DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS ON THE OZONE, THE ECOLOGICAL BACKLASH OF A MASSIVE

SOVIET ATTACK THAT WOULD HURT THEM EVEN IF WE COULDN'T

RETALIATE -- WE FOUND IT APPROPRIATE TO EXPLAIN THE GIST  
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OF IT AND TO RELATE IT TO CURRENT EVENTS. AS IT SO  
HAPPENS, A CURRENT EVENT IS THE SENATORS' RESOLUTION.  
Q: I THINK WHAT WE ARE GETTING AT HERE IS A PUZZLED RE-  
ACTION TO THIS RESOLUTION. HERE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN  
MONTHS WE GET A WHOLE BUNCH OF SENATORS STANDING UP  
TRYING, IN EFFECT, TO SUPPORT THE THRUST OF THE  
ADMINISTRATION'S NEGOTIATING POSITION AGAINST ATTACKS  
THAT HAVE BEEN MADE ON THAT KIND OF APPROACH, FOR THE  
LAST SIX MONTHS OR A YEAR. AND HERE A PRESS CONFERENCE  
IS HELD TO BEAT UP ON AN ASPECT OF THAT RESOLUTION  
RATHER THAN ENCOURAGE THE FACT THAT YOU FINALLY GOT  
SUPPORT OUT OF THE SENATE WITH THESE GUYS STANDING UP  
AND SAYING WE'RE BEHIND YOU.

A: WELL, I HAVE MENTIONED THESE TWO ASPECTS AND I HOPE  
I AM NOT ACCUSED OF TALKING WITH A FORKED TONGUE HERE. I  
HAVE MENTIONED THE BENEFICIAL ASPECTS OF THE RESOLUTION,  
THE THRUST OF SUPPORT FOR SALT, WHICH WE WELCOME AND FOR  
WHICH WE ARE GRATEFUL. AND I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT IN AN  
EXCHANGE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, IN AN EXCHANGE OF FACTUAL  
INFORMATION ON WHICH CONGRESS CAN BASE ITS JUDGMENT THAT

WE ARE NOT SILENT ABOUT POSSIBLE DEFECTS HERE, WHICH I  
HAVE EXPLAINED IN PRIVATE TO THE SENATORS.

Q: WHEN YOU SAY YOU HAVE EXPLAINED THE DEFECTS TO THE  
SENATORS, AGAIN WE MUST DRAW THE INFERENCE THAT THE  
SENATORS DID NOT ACCEPT YOUR LOGIC.

A: THESE ARE VERY COMPLICATED MATTERS, AND IN DRAFTING  
RESOLUTIONS IT IS CERTAINLY POSSIBLE THAT PIECES GET  
PUT TOGETHER WHICH, BASED ON MORE SOLID CONSULTATION WOULD  
NOT HAVE BEEN PUT IN THERE.

Q: ARE YOU SAYING THERE WAS CONSULTATION IN THE DRAFTING  
OF THE RESOLUTION BETWEEN THE SENATORS OR THEIR  
STAFFERS AND SOME OF YOUR PEOPLE?

A: NO, I AM NOT SAYING THAT. THERE WAS NO SUCH CON-  
SULTATION BETWEEN MY PEOPLE AND THE SENATE STAFFERS;  
BUT THERE HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE CONSULTATION, SOME OF WHICH  
I MYSELF ENGAGED IN, ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF CRUISE  
MISSILE VERIFICATION WITH SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN.

Q: DR. IKLE, WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO GET AT, THERE ARE A  
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NUMBER OF QUESTIONS NOW, FOR EXAMPLE, WHY IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO SIT DOWN QUIETLY WITH THESE THREE SENATORS AND SAY, GENTLEMEN, WE LOVE MOST OF WHAT YOU SAY, BUT HERE IS WHY WE DON'T ACCEPT THIS ONE ASPECT OF IT. WHY IS IT NECESSARY TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE AND HIT THEM OVER THE HEAD WITH A CLUB?

A: WELL, FIRST OF ALL I HOPE I'M NOT BEING MISUNDERSTOOD AS BEATING THEM OVER THE HEAD. I REPEAT AGAIN, WE WELCOME THE SPIRIT OF SUPPORT CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTION, I'M DISCUSSING A VERY PARTICULAR PROBLEM HERE -- THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM THAT RELATES TO OUR PUBLICATION. NOW IT SO HAPPENS, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURE OF TIME OR SO, WE WERE NOT INVITED TO CONSULT ON THIS RESOLUTION BEFOREHAND. THAT'S UNDERSTANDABLE.

Q: YOU SEEM TO ANTICIPATE THAT THIS ASPECT OF THIS RESOLUTION COULD GET THE ADMINISTRATION INTO A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE. OTHERWISE YOU WOULDN'T GO TO ALL THE TROUBLE OF HAVING THIS PRESS CONFERENCE.

A: I WOULDN'T PUT IT IN TERMS OF THE ADMINISTRATION GETTING INTO TROUBLE. I AM PUTTING IT MORE IN TERMS OF THE CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC GETTING INTO TROUBLE OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS, OF GETTING A SALT AGREEMENT WHERE YOU HAVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS THAT HAVE SUCH AMBIGUITIES THAT THE CURRENT DISPUTE ABOUT VIOLATIONS, WHICH IS TROUBESOME, WOULD REALLY PALE INTO SIGNIFICANCE.

Q. HAS SECRETARY KISSINGER MADE THE SAME ARGUMENTS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THESE CRUISE MISSILES?

A. SECRETARY KISSINGER MADE THE SAME COMMENTS ON THIS RESOLUTION -- THAT WE WELCOME THE SPIRIT OF IT BUT THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT IT -- YESTERDAY.

Q. BUT DID HE TAKE THE SAME SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS TO IT?

A. WHAT MY SUPERIORS AND COLLEAGUES DISCUSS IN THE INTERNAL COUNCILS OF THE VERIFICATION PANEL OF THE NSC I THINK I SHOULD NOT DISCUSS HERE.

Q. THE SECRETARY DID MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT YESTERDAY SAYING HE OPPOSED LIMITATION ON TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES UNILATERALLY WITHOUT BEING NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIETS, WHICH IS QUITE A DIFFERENT OBJECTION TO THE ONE YOU MADE, WHICH IS THAT THE TESTING LIMITATION IS UNCLASSIFIED

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INHERENTLY UNVERIFIABLE.

A. CERTAIN TESTING LIMITATIONS ...

Q. SOME OF US IN THIS ROOM HAVE HEARD A SENIOR OFFICIAL REPEAT MUCH OF THE ARGUMENT YOU HAVE JUST MADE BY SAYING, ONE, IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DEPLOY A

STRATEGIC WEAPON AT 2500 KMS THAT WAS ONLY TESTED AT 600, AND SECONDLY THAT THE QUESTION OF VERIFYING CRUISE MISSILES IS AT PRESENT THEIR PROBLEM WITH US, RATHER THAN OUR PROBLEM WITH THEM.

A. THESE ARE ALL SOLID ARGUMENTS, WHOEVER MIGHT HAVE MADE THEM. (LAUGHTER) THE IDEA, FOR THE RUSSIANS TO RELY SUBSTANTIALLY ON AN UNTESTED SYSTEM WOULD BE UNLIKELY IS A VALID ONE. BUT THAT LEADS TO THE PROBLEM WE HAVE DISCUSSED BEFORE -- THAT THERE MAY BE OTHER WAYS TO TEST THE SYSTEM THAT WE CANNOT SEE. THAT DEPENDS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AGREEMENT. THE FACT THAT WE ARE NOW, OR WE THINK WE ARE NOW, THE RESOLUTION SAYS SO, THAT WE ARE AHEAD IN THE GUIDANCE TECHNOLOGY OF CRUISE MISSILES MEANS THAT AFTER THE NEXT FEW YEARS WE MAY HAVE AN ANXIOUS PROBLEM HERE AS TO WHAT THE RUSSIANS ARE DOING. BUT IT IS OUR OBLIGATION TO LOOK AHEAD -- NOT FOR THIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT FOR TWO ADMINISTRATIONS DOWN THE ROAD, THAT'S WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO HAVE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION IN SORTING OUT WHAT IS HAPPENING TO A SALT 11 AGREEMENT WHICH WE HOPE TO NEGOTIATE THIS YEAR.

Q. DOES YOUR PERCEPTION OF THIS TESTING LIE IN THE FACT THAT THE U.S. NAVY IS GOING TO HAVE A COMPETITIVE PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM TO SELECT A WINNER WITHOUT EVER FLYING

THEIR OWN CRUISE MISSILE THE FULL RANGE? IT WILL NEVER BE FLOWN FULL RANGE BEFORE A WINNER IS SELECTED.

A: THAT'S NOT REALLY THE BASIS OF MY STATEMENT, IF I UNDERSTAND YOU RIGHT. THE PROBLEM OF RELYING ON PARTICULAR TEST PROHIBITIONS TO VERIFY THE RANGE OF A

CRUISE MISSILE ARE OF A DIFFERENT KIND.

Q: EXCEPT WE NOW HAVE THE TECHNOLOGY IN HAND TO DEVELOP A CRUISE MISSILE WITH SIGNIFICANT RANGE WITHOUT HAVING TO TEST IT WHICH WOULD CAUSE A VERY VERIFICATION  
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PROBLEM FOR THEM?

A: WELL, THAT'S THE GIST OF IT, THAT YOU MAY NOT HAVE TO TEST THE FULL RANGE, THAT YOU MAY NOT HAVE TO TEST IT IN A PARTICULAR MODE, THAT YOU WANT TO DEPLOY IT, THAT YOU MAY BE ABLE TO CONCEAL TESTS.

Q: DR. IKLE, WOULD YOU PREFER A SALT TREATY THAT LEAVES OUT CRUISE MISSILES AND BACKFIRE TO A SALT TREATY THAT INCLUDES THE PROPOSAL OF THESE SENATORS?

A: I DON'T WANT TO MAKE EXPLICIT MY POSITION THAT RELATES TO MY RECOMMENDATIONS ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THE THRUST OF IT IS THAT WE MUST WORK OUT A STRUCTURE FOR SALT AND WE ARE TRYING TO DO THAT, THAT IS VIABLE, THAT



CAN LAST OVER TEN YEARS; HENCE, THAT AVOIDS THE KIND OF VERIFICATION PROBLEMS AND SEPARATION PROBLEMS BETWEEN TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC, THAT THIS PARTICULAR APPROACH IN THIS RESOLUTION ...

Q: IS THAT WORSE THAN NOT CONSTRAINING AT ALL, THE BACKFIRE OR THE CRUISE MISSILE?

A: BUT IT DOESN'T MEAN THAT YOU HAVE TO GO RIGHT STRAIGHT FOR THE BAD CHOICE.

Q: HOW WOULD YOU MAKE A JUDGMENT OF WHAT WAS THE BAD CHOICE?

A: THAT WOULD DEPEND ON THE OVERALL STRUCTURE, OF THE OVERALL BALANCE OF THE AGREEMENT, WHETHER THERE ARE COMPENSATING FEATURES FOR ITS DEFECTS. OUR JOB IS TO AVOID THE DEFECTS -- NOT TO SETTLE FOR DEFECTS BECAUSE ONE CAN IMAGINE SOMETHING THAT MIGHT BE WORSE.

Q: YOU HAVE SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS CONFERENCE IS TO RAISE A PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON THIS QUESTION. ARE YOU LOOKING FOR PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE VERIFICATION ISSUE OF CRUISE MISSILES? I'M NOT SURE THAT WE ARE GOING TO BE ABLE TO CONVEY THIS KIND OF UNDERSTANDING.

A: IT IS A VERY DIFFICULT TO CONVEY TO THE PUBLIC OR EVEN A SOPHISTICATED GROUP SUCH AS YOU. THAT IS WHY WE

HAVE LABORED VERY HARD ON THIS EXPLANATION FOR ALMOST A YEAR. I THINK WE HAVE NOW A RATHER SUCCINCT PRESENTATION WHICH GOES TO THE MANY AND DIFFICULT INTERLACED ARGUMENTS THAT YOU HAVE TO THINK THROUGH  
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IF YOU WANT TO SETTLE ON AN AGREEMENT THAT CAN BE MONITORED.

Q: WHAT YOU ARE SAYING TODAY IS THAT SENATORS KENNEDY, HUMPHREY AND JAVITS, WHO ARE VERY SOPHISTICATED TOO, WITH VERY SOPHISTICATED STAFFS, ALSO ...

A: ALL OF US CAN MAKE MISTAKES. WE HAVE MADE MISTAKES IN THE PAST. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. INGERSOLL

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TOSEC, PRESS CONFERENCES, SALT (ARMS CONTROL)  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 28 FEB 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976STATE049319  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** PASANJUAN  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760076-0684  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t1976021/aaaaaaie.tel  
**Line Count:** 913  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN ACDA  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 17  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** castelsl  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 20 JUL 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <20 JUL 2004 by schwenja>; APPROVED <24 AUG 2004 by castelsl>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** DR. IKLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE 2/27/76  
**TAGS:** PARM, US, UR, (IKLE, FRED C)  
**To:** SECRETARY  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006